

RAND letter Professor
Brennan

~~our policy making at other places, other times.~~

Meanwhile, relying on my own ^{pressed} ~~acted on~~
the lesson of my own experience for current policy ~~that~~
that we should ~~renew~~ avoid, ^{further} ~~avoided~~ ~~with~~
escalation, ^{*} and should move to end our involvement ^{*}

~~* This was the consensus ^{in 1967} of the "Brennan group statement" cited below, drafted for the eyes of the Secretary of State and the President. (But leaked from the White House: see the New York Times, _____) in December, 1967. Its ~~emphasis on escalation~~ reflected my ~~particular concern that~~~~

on Expenditure officials, ^{to others} ~~that~~ they ought listen to, and ~~renewing~~ on the advisors to Presidential candidates.

This was the burden of my ^{commit} ~~thanks~~ to ^{such} ~~the~~ groups as the RAND Board of Trustees, ~~and~~ the Harvard/MIT Arms Control Seminar, ~~in November, 1967~~, and ~~to~~ the "Brennan group" gathered by Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie for International Peace*, in November and December, 1967. ~~to~~ I sought, to counteract
— ~~initially~~, in those last months before Feb, 1968 —

* Renamed by Frances Fitzgerald, a participant, the "Carnegie Endowment for Limited War," ^{in response to the} ~~at the close of one discussion~~ ~~initial group focus~~ ^{initial group focus} focused on "cooling down" the conflict.

^{extreme} the ~~optimism~~ just brought back from Saigon ~~those~~
~~last months before Tet, 1968~~ ^{for} the briefing
team of Bunker, Westmoreland and Komer; and showed
all, to oppose the prospect of escalation into
Laos, Cambodia and North Vietnam that I smelled*
just then in Westmoreland's strategy and backgrounders.

* Correctly, it turns out; John Henry's senior honors thesis,
Harvard, 1971, on the decisions of March, 1968, has
revealed ~~what~~ General Westmoreland's proposed
strategy in early 1968 to do just that.

Nearly every person present
~~most of those~~ in each of these groups, ~~had~~ ^{had} as
former government officials or consultants, had spent
(helping devise winning strategies for the President against
most of his professional life as a Cold Warrior, ^{As}
^{national enemies, mainly "Communists."}
had I, ~~Ad~~ ~~had~~ ~~no~~ ~~secret~~ of that, ^{shared}
I drew heavily on that background, for ~~these~~ ~~addresses~~
~~addresses~~, to make credible the critical and pessimistic
comments that followed.** Nor was this disingenuous.
Those conclusions were painful for me to learn and painful,
still, to say; and ~~if~~ ~~the~~ ~~Cold~~ ~~war~~ may ~~may~~ Cold War

~~had~~ ~~that is, nearly every person present had~~
~~spent~~

premises I still shared with them ~~about~~ almost unquestioningly was an orientation toward the Expectation; if the time had come to cut losses, to reach an accommodation with an adversary, ~~it~~ it was for the President to decide how, when, on what terms, just as earlier it was his ~~right~~ to determine national objectives and strategy in pursuit of victory.

before Spens: effort of his — conceal calculation,
involved (Dir assess — McE B, memo — "That's murder")
responsibility

War Crimes — reports — need to risk...

Congress, press, courts... ^{but} need for info... also, desire to
shift responsibility — but need to accept: by public
as well... need for mandate, Cong. action.

Much ^{Prob} Now: N. gable — public agrees with obj
of war... (Kalks) Boothell, YC

Events now focus, implicit as likelihoods in policy
since 1969 — all public accept, as consistent with
N. promises? Will they demand controls for candidates,
action of Congress? Who is to be master of foreign
policy? Dem or

WWIII dynamic; "time front war: on Power...
Baker...")

Condi. style? Messing? What would Cong,
public have said if they knew all this? Ashin didn't
want to bail out. (see Stern's memo.) Fear of dynamic → WWIII.
(mes)

yet Rusk-Kland (other refs)

Porter...

(didn't see in VN...)

Didn't have a man for its solution, somewhat different
from Cuba II ("triumph" — (cf. De Rod) — see Rogers).

CFR

Refs on mes; Rosten on GW

X

President must win against every

→ must control (manip)

and → must lie, conceal

X

Responsibility.

"~~Position~~ of the CW intellectual is to

speak the truth to the President and with

lies to the public — so as to keep the ² good

Pres — officer, & in control
help defeat our enemy."

X

Neustadt

— "What's good for the Pres is good for the
country."

Pres is part of the problem

Pres knows —

(Cong is part of the problem...

Courts are —

Business is —

Does Pres ^{really} oppose the

Island groups?

A "contradiction"?

Does "McLiam" really threaten

business interests?

X

Any:

N-V CO

(Dennis, Zinn, McRaghuels, Bondurant, Gendli,

Revisionist

(Quaglier)

— Popkin is not...

Ashe

Erasmus...

LW = Endless War